The question of Ethiopia’s sovereign access to the sea has been a central and recurring theme in the country’s modern statecraft, particularly from the 1940s onward. One of the most consequential moments in shaping this aspiration was Emperor Haile Selassie’s meeting with U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy on 13 February 1945. Held during the final months of the Second World War, this encounter unfolded at a moment when the international order was being fundamentally reconfigured: colonial territories were under review, imperial boundaries were in question, and new global powers—most notably the United States—were assuming decisive influence over the future of former Italian possessions such as Eritrea.
Ethiopia’s Strategic Imperative and the Post-War Order
Ethiopia’s landlocked status was effectively sealed when Emperor Menelik II concluded a series of treaties defining the boundary between Italian-occupied Eritrea and the Abyssinian Empire. Following the Italian invasion in 1936 and his eventual restoration to power after six years in exile, Emperor Haile Selassie made the acquisition of a permanent, sovereign maritime outlet one of his central political objectives. From that point onward, successive Ethiopian rulers framed the quest for access to the Red Sea not merely as a matter of commercial convenience, but as an existential requirement tied to national security, state prestige, and the expansion of imperial influence.
Though the post-1991 EPRDF government did not openly advocate for a sovereign corridor to the sea, its policies reflected a more indirect form of irredentism—seeking to weaken the Eritrean state, destabilize its economy, and, at critical moments, wage war with the strategic aim of retaking the port of Assab. This approach maintained Ethiopia’s historic fixation on controlling a Red Sea outlet, even when not articulated as an explicit territorial claim.
By 1945, with Allied victory imminent and the future of the Italian colonies under review, Haile Selassie viewed the moment as uniquely opportune.
The Emperor’s journey from Addis Ababa to Cairo—and then onward to the Quincy anchored on the Great Bitter Lake—was therefore not ceremonial. It reflected a calculated diplomatic intervention aimed at influencing post-war territorial settlements, particularly regarding Eritrea.
The Meeting Aboard the USS Quincy
Haile Selassie boarded the U.S. warship at approximately 17:00 on 13 February 1945. Present in the meeting were President Roosevelt, Emperor Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian interpreter and diplomat Yilma Deressa, and the U.S. Secretary of State. The conversation began in French but quickly transitioned into Amharic once the Emperor produced a handwritten memorandum of demands and requests. The switch in language, combined with the Emperor’s decision to read directly from prepared notes, signaled the seriousness and deliberateness of his objectives.
The Emperor’s memorandum was extensive. Although no complete English translation survives in U.S. archives—an archival silence that complicates reconstructing the document’s full content—the notes taken by the Secretary of State and summaries attest to the central themes:
- Securing a sovereign maritime outlet for Ethiopia, ideally through the acquisition of an Eritrean port.
- Franco-Ethiopian Railway particularly railways linking the Ethiopian highlands to the Red Sea.
- Arms supply and military support for post-war reconstruction.
- Clarifying the political future of Eritrea and adjacent territories under Allied administration.
- Addressing questions of war-crimes and wartime reparations.
Throughout the meeting, Haile Selassie repeatedly returned to the question of sea access. When Roosevelt directly asked whether Ethiopia preferred Djibouti or an Eritrean port, the Emperor stated unambiguously that Djibouti was insufficient—a stopgap subject to French control—and that Ethiopia required a permanent, sovereign outlet on the Red Sea. In Ethiopian strategic thinking, control over an Eritrean port represented not only economic lifelines but an existential guarantee of independence in an era of shifting regional alliances.
In addition, when mention was made of Italian Somali-land by the Emperor, the President asked whether it had been at some time a part of Ethiopia, and the Emperor replied in the affirmative.
Roosevelt’s responses were cautious. He acknowledged the feasibility of constructing a railway to an Eritrean port and advised the Emperor to avoid excessive payments to American contractors. He also offered general observations about potential petroleum prospects in the region. However, the President refrained from promising political intervention or territorial reassignment. His position aligned with the broader Allied reluctance to unilaterally redraw colonial frontiers in the immediate post-war period.
Allied Skepticism and the Limits of Wartime Diplomacy
The Emperor’s appeal aboard the Quincy must be understood within the broader diplomatic context. Britain, which administered Eritrea after 1941, had its own strategic interests and envisioned multiple possible futures for the territory, ranging from partition to trusteeship. The United States, while increasingly influential, was not prepared to impose a settlement favorable to Ethiopia against British preferences or against the emerging framework of international trusteeship under the United Nations.
Subsequent meetings between Haile Selassie and British leaders Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden in Cairo confirmed the limitations of Ethiopian leverage. Although the Emperor pressed his case vigorously, the British position remained noncommittal, and no immediate commitments were made to alter Eritrea’s status in Ethiopia’s favor.
Aftermath and Long-Term Consequences
Despite the absence of explicit promises at the Quincy meeting, Haile Selassie’s diplomatic efforts contributed to the broader discourse surrounding Eritrea’s future. Ethiopia’s persistent claim—rooted in strategic necessity rather than wartime entitlement—remained central in post-war negotiations.
The 1950 UN resolution that established the Eritrean–Ethiopian federation in 1952 was shaped by a convergence of Ethiopia’s persistent irredentist lobbying and the United States’ strategic priorities in the region, including securing a communications and intelligence facility in Asmara. For Emperor Haile Selassie, however, the federation was only a step toward a larger aim: the complete incorporation of Eritrea. That objective was pursued gradually and ultimately realized through the unlawful dissolution of the federation in 1962, when Eritrea was annexed and reduced to an Ethiopian province.
Conclusion
The February 1945 meeting aboard the USS Quincy marked a pivotal moment in Ethiopia’s pursuit of Eritrea and its ports. Haile Selassie’s calculated irredentist maneuver, coupled with his persistent advocacy for sovereign access to the sea, underscored the strategic importance of maritime control in Ethiopia’s postwar ambitions. While the major powers did not immediately endorse his demands, the Emperor’s relentless efforts—alongside the absence of strong Eritrean resistance—shaped international deliberations over Eritrea’s future and laid the groundwork for the eventual federation and subsequent annexation
Abiy is simply repackaging an old agenda in a new, shiny bottle. Driven by UAE financing and by the lingering irredentist nostalgia of certain old-guard elites and power-hungry loyalists, he has revived the same discredited arguments about Ethiopia’s ‘sovereign access to the sea’ and the erasure of Eritrea’s sovereignty—now amplified across Ethiopia’s state controlled airwaves and social-media studios.
But eighty years later, the political landscape is entirely different. Abiy’s Ethiopia is not Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia, nor is today’s world the world of the 1940s. Ethiopia under Abiy is fractured, led by a weakened centre, burdened with a collapsing economy, a rag-tag military, and a leadership abandoned by former allies who are now simply waiting for change. Eritrea, by contrast, has a politically conscious population, an uncompromising commitment to sovereignty, a growing network of allies, and—critically—a formidable defence force capable of safeguarding its territorial integrity.
The question now is what Abiy intends to do next. He claims to have discussed the matter with the Americans, Russians, Chinese, the AU, and the EU, yet none have shown sympathy for his demand for ‘sovereign access to the sea.’ Instead, all—including neighbouring states—have urged him to pursue dialogue grounded in international law. Abiy, however, continues to reject this approach and is signalling a willingness to drag Ethiopia toward a new conflict with Eritrea.
